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Abstract 
In this paper, we build a simple model to explain the choice of migration method and the root 
causes of international human trafficking (IHT). Our analyses result in several implications on 
the problems related to IHT. First, IHT is driven by poverty and international 
productivity/living quality disparities. Second, the existing humanitarian and/or suppressive 
approaches cannot solve the problem. Third, the best option for solving the problem is setting 
up the ‘reciprocal direct investment’ (RDI) scheme between leading and lagged economies. 
The RDI scheme can facilitate improvements in the quality of public governance in lagged 
economies and directly promote international competition, efficiency, trade liberalization and 
division of labor. The resulting convergence in global living quality at a higher level across 
nations will eliminate the root causes of illicit migrations. 
 
Keywords: human trafficking, global development, income disparities. 
JEL classifications: O2, F2  
 
 
  
                                                                                        2 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we investigate the root causes of international human trafficking (IHT) 
by building a simple model that captures the key factors driving the choices of migration 
decisions and methods. Afterwards, we propose a solution that attacks the root causes of IHT 
for resolving/alleviating the related problems. 
Although human trafficking (HT) is considered a form of modern slavery and is one of 
the greatest human rights challenges to advanced countries, our understanding on the causes 
of HT and the effectiveness of our current initiatives to deal with the problem is minimal at 
best. Currently, most countries view IHT as an issue of national security, and have tried to 
combat the activity by criminalizing illegal migrants. The success, however, has been very 
limited. We observe growing level of IHT along with new and stronger migration pressures 
and related organized crime activities as documented in various studies. For instance, after a 
comprehensive study on the IHT activities in various regions and countries, Shelley (2010) 
provides abundant evidences on the prevalence of the activities and the root causes of illicit 
migrations. She concludes that IHT is not only a serious humanitarian problem today but will 
continue to grow in this century which poses a serious challenge to academics and 
policymakers. With better modes of communication and transportation, the cost of IHT is 
decreasing over time. Potential migrants in source countries also have become more aware of 
political and economic disparities across nations that strengthen their desire to migrate for 
taking advantage of opportunities available in destination countries. Various estimates suggest 
that trafficking in human beings was one of the most profitable illicit industries, among the 
trade in illicit drugs and weapons. IHT violates human rights, state borders, and criminal laws. 
It always involves organized crimes, coercive sexual exploitation, labour exploitation and 
juvenile delinquency which are transnational in scope. They generate substantial illicit 
proceeds to criminal organizations that jeopardize social stabilities in related countries. In this 
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increasingly globalized world, preventing and combating IHT is therefore considered to be an 
important global challenge to related countries and international humanitarian organizations. 
For solving the IHT problems, we need to understand the fundamental driving factors 
for the activities and to devise feasible schemes that can eliminate the fundamental driving 
factors. In this paper, we build a simple model to explain the choice of migration methods that 
are treated as a constrained rational choice of the migrants. They evaluate the costs and 
benefits of choosing different ways to migrate given the specific environment and constraints 
they are facing. Our analyses suggest that the root causes of illicit migrations are poverty and 
international productivity/living standard disparities caused by the divergences in the levels of 
public governance, technology and capital endowments. Second, the humanitarian and the 
suppressive approaches cannot solve the problem from its root causes. 
We suggest that the best option for solving the problem is setting up an international 
‘reciprocal direct investment’ (RDI) scheme across nations. The RDI scheme can facilitate 
international competition, efficiency, trade liberalization, and division of labor by exchanging 
production base, capital and land across nations. It can therefore substantially facilitate the 
convergence of living quality across countries without labor market liberalization. The global 
production and allocation efficiencies will be improved that generate substantial wealth 
increases to all countries involved.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will formulate a 
model to understand the causes of and determinants of IHT. Based on the understandings, we 
propose a novel way of international cooperation and demonstrate that it is Pareto improving 
to the countries involved and potentially able to eliminate IHT activities from its root causes. 
The last section concludes the paper.  
2. The Theory and Determinants of Human Trafficking 
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Similar to international trade in goods and service, international ‘exchange of people’ 
is a profitable business because globalization has made it easier to move people around the 
world. At the same time, polarization of global development has also made the earning gap of 
labor services increasingly divergent across countries while people who want to move to 
leading countries for jobs and earnings are facing ever more stringent barriers on legal 
migration.1 The growing, but unsatisfied demand for legal migration options has created a 
breeding ground for illicit migrations that include IHT and smuggling. Criminal organizations 
take the migration demand and make enormous profit from people’s desire to gain from the 
income disparities across nations. It contributes to the vicious circle of crime, corruption, 
violence, poverty and underdevelopment in the lagged economies. 
The prevalence of IHT is normally attributed to insufficient information and education, 
corruption in law enforcement and poor border controls by most media and policy reports 
rather than the results of international income and productivity disparities. From the viewpoint 
of economics, migration is just one of the trading activities for capturing the benefits from the 
exchange in the global marketplace. Assume a representative potential migrant who is 
considering three migration methods: legal migration (L), migrant smuggling (E) and human 
trafficking (T). The expected gains from migration may include diverse attributes such as 
better living environment, freedom, personal security and the wage differential. For simplicity, 
the expected benefits of international migration to an individual i are separated into the wage 
earning differential (Wdi – Wsi ) and the non-wage benefits (Ndi – Nsi) between the destination 
country (d) and the source country (s) that are independent to the migration methods. The 
                                                 
1 Hanson (2010), among many others, documents about the political motivations for immigration restrictions in 
high-income countries although abundant evidences suggest that allowing labor to move from low-income to 
high-income countries would generate substantial gains in global income. 
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expected net gains of i from international migration (MGi) therefore equals to: (Wdi – Wsi ) + 
(Ndi – Nsi).2 The expected total cost of the three migration options respectively equals to:   
CLi = CLim + CLiu , 
CEi = CEim + CEiu , 
CTi = CTim + CTiu , 
 
The total costs of the three migration options to an individual (CKi ), where K equals L, E, T, 
are separated into the monetary (CKim) and non-monetary (CKiu) costs. Individual chooses the 
migration method for maximizing her/his net gain from migration (NGi):  
 
NGKi = MGi – Cki = (Wdi – Wsi ) + (Ndi – Nsi) – (CKim + CKiu )   
 
Other things equal, an individual with the higher/lower the Wdi / Wsi and Ndi / Nsi , the higher 
the NGi and therefore, the higher the chance to migrate. Given the MGi, individual will choose 
the lowest migration cost for maximizing NGi.3 In general, the total cost of the migration 
options differ substantially to each other and CLi < CEi < CTi . Other things equal, every 
individual will choose legal migration as the first choice of migration method. However, legal 
migration is subjected to quota and border controls. Normally, only individuals who are well 
educated and/or skillful will be selected by destination countries. Second to the legal 
migration, smuggling will be chosen. Human smuggling normally operates as a commercial 
service that occurs with the consent of migrants who pay a lump sum to buy the smuggling 
                                                 
2 Obviously, migration methods have effects on MGi. However, for simplicity, we assume that it depends on 
individual characteristics only. The differences in NG due to different migration methods are modeled to be 
captured by the CKi . This assumption has no effect on the focuses of our analyses. 
3 All the benefits and costs are the measurements of the individual’s total subjective present discounted values 
over her/his lifetime. This simplification has no effect on our analyses as the major factors determining related 
migration decisions are already captured by the items included in NGi. The other factors found to have effects on 
migration decision such as social networks can be considered as either raising the expected Wdi and Ndi or 
lowering CKiu . 
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services. The process does not typically involve any forms of exploitation. However, the 
choice of human smuggling is subjected to the wealth constraint: only individual who can pay 
CEim will be able to select the method. As a result, IHT victims are ‘self-selected’ to be 
unskilled labors who cannot migrate legally and do not have enough cash to pay the price of 
smuggling. That is, they suffer from poverty with low Wsi and Nsi. They may implicitly or 
explicitly ‘borrow’ from the trafficker for the smuggling services and repay the ‘loan’ from 
their future earnings in the destination country.4 IHT victims are therefore typically of 
individuals who have weak bargaining power and with no other choices but ‘selecting’ IHT to 
satisfy the migration purpose. There is no wonder that a majority of the 
IHT victims are female and minors from poor families 
According to the understandings, individuals choosing different migration methods 
have different characteristics as follows: 
 
IHT victims: 
i. NGi > 0.5  
ii. They are not qualified for migrating legally. 
iii. They are poor with insufficient cash to pay for the smuggling costs. 
iv. The migrants normally exploited by human traffickers due to their weak bargaining    
power and position relative to the traffickers in destination countries. 
 
                                                 
4 Human trafficking is defined as a situation in which an individual travelling abroad was locked and forced to 
work for no or little pay via means of coercion. As such, trafficking differs importantly from migrant smuggling, 
a commercial service that normally occurs with the consent of migrants, which does not typically involve any 
forms of exploitation. In our model, we abstract away the coercion, deception and asymmetric information 
between the traffickers and the migrants. The potential migrants ‘choose’ IHT because they cannot pay the cost 
of smuggling migration and therefore have to repay the trafficking cost by working in the destination countries. 
In many cases, they are misled by the traffickers that the expected (MGi – CTi ) is positive while the realized gain 
of the IHT is negative. 
5 The NGi should be interpreted as the expected subjective value of the individuals when they make the 
migration decisions. In many cases, the IHT victims are exploited by being forced to work for no or little pay via 
means of coercion even though they fully repay the trafficking cost that make the realized cost much higher than 
expected. This expected subjective cost is captured by the CTiu that is normally substantially higher than the other 
forms of international migration. 
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Human smuggling: 
i. NGi > 0.  
ii. They are not qualified for migrating legally. 
iii. They have enough cash to pay for the smuggling costs (CEim). 
 
Legal migrants:   
i. NGi > 0. 
ii. The migrants have qualifications satisfying the requirements of the destination   
countries. They are normally well-educated, skillful and therefore with high Wdi and Wsi . 
iii. The number of legal migrants is limited by the criteria set by destination countries. 
 
In general, the model suggests that it is the expected net gains from living abroad that 
motivate the migration decision. It is the constraints facing potential migrants that determine 
their choice on the migration methods. By stressing human smuggling and trafficking being 
driven by the rational calculation of costs and benefits, we can draw some policy implications 
based on economic principles: 
1. The model suggests that existing humanitarian treatments towards illicit migrants will be 
ineffective to resolve the IHT problems. The humanitarian treatments lower the cost of 
the activities, raise their NGi and therefore induce more illicit migration activities.  
2. Instead, propaganda, advertisements and publicizing the sufferings of the IHT victims in 
the source countries can raise the expected subjective costs of potential IHT migrants 
which can reduce the demand for the activities.  
3. The destination and the source countries tend to have a wide wage gap and the trafficking 
cost tend to be low in comparing to other potential destinations. In other words, migrants 
tend to flow from lagged economies towards leading economies. Other things equal, they 
tend to migrate to countries with social networks and/or neighboring countries for 
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enjoying lower monetary and subjective costs. 
4. The most humanitarian solution to the IHT problems is to device international schemes 
that can promote the convergence of living quality between the leading/destination and 
lagged/source economies such that NGi narrows over time. This will reduce the need for 
IHT from its root causes. 
 
In the following sections, we try to understand the causes of the international divergences in 
living quality drawn from the evidences, models and implications respectively in Mo (2010a, 
b, c, d). Afterwards, we will formulate a ‘humanitarian scheme’ for solving the IHT problems 
accordingly.  
 
3. The Causes of the Divergent World 
The analyses in section 2 suggest that illicit migrations are unavoidable in a world of 
large income disparities without free flow of labor. On the side of destination economies, they 
are willing to offer higher wage level for labor services than the lagged economies due to their 
higher level of productivity and capital stock. On the side of source countries, the labors in the 
lagged economies suffer from insufficient job opportunities and poor living quality. Peoples 
in the lagged economies are motivated to migrate out to the leading economies for seeking 
better living quality for themselves and their families. It is the polarizing world with reducing 
communication and transportation cost that drive the increasing intensity of migration 
activities and it is the poverty of the potential migrants who cannot afford paying the 
smuggling costs in advance that pushes them to select IHT for the purpose. IHT victims will 
therefore be substantially reduced if the gap of living quality narrows down across countries. 
In this section, we explain the sources of global income disparities. In the next section, the 
‘reciprocal direct investment’ scheme will be formulated that can effectively promote the 
convergence of the global economies while at the same time, generate mutual benefits to all 
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parties and countries involved.    
Following the contributions in Mo (2011c, d), the direct causes of economic disparities 
across countries are generated by the different quantity of tools (X) and the number of its 
variety (Vj), such that a representative firm in the destination/leading economies has much 
higher quantity and variety of tools. The output level of a firm (Yj) depends on the amount of 
capital service (Kj) and labor (Lj) employed by the firm, such that: 
;βα jjj LKY =  with α + β = 1 ; and 0 < α < 1 .                 (E1)             
The level of capital service Kj is the aggregate of a variety of tools (Xi). Under some 
simplifying assumptions, profit maximizing of the entrepreneur implies that: 
∑=
i
ij XK
θθ /1** ][ = */1 jj XV
θ ,                        (E2) 
with 0 < θ < 1 and, i = 1 to vj, the tools variety employed by the firm. The parameter θ 
governs the elasticity of substitution between the tools. A higher value of θ indicates that Xi 
can be more easily substituted for each other in the production of the capital service while a 
lower values of θ correspond to greater differentiation among the set of tools. (E2) indicates 
that the level of capital service is determined by the variety of tools, Vj and the quantity of 
tools (Xj). Substitute (E2) into (E1), we have:6 
βαθ
α
jjjj LXVY = = βα jjj LXA ; where A equals θ
α
jV  and α/θ> 1.       (E3) 
(E3) suggests that given the same quantity of tools and labor, the larger the amount of tools 
variety, the higher will be the total output level. Moreover, the higher the tools variety, the 
higher the marginal product of tools and labor will be, since: 
MPX = j/j
j
L
V ( )
X
α θ βα ; and,  MPL = j/j
j
X
V ( )
L
α θ αβ                (E4) 
where MPXj and MPLj are the marginal product of tools and labor respectively. 
In competitive markets, factors prices are equal to their marginal product. As a result, the 
                                                 
6 For more detail derivations, please refer to Mo (2011c). 
                                                                                        10 
higher wage in the destination countries are driven by their higher variety and quantity of 
tools, while the source countries vice versa. 
 Suppose the firms in destination and source countries have the sets of (Vd , Xd) and 
(Vs , Xs) respectively with (Vd , Xd) > (Vs , Xs), the source country thus has lower wage than the 
destination country. Labor will migrate to the destination/leading economies for capturing the 
higher income from their labor services. This implies that the monetary motives of 
international migration will be reduced if their MPL converge when international divergences 
in V and (X/L) are reduced. As suggested in Mo (2010d, 2007), the convergence can only be 
achieved by the improvements in the quality of public governance that determines the 
motivation structure in the lagged economies. For alleviating the IHT effectively, we have to 
formulate a feasible scheme that is most effective for inducing a rapid convergence in the 
quality of public governance and therefore, a rapid convergence in living quality across 
nations. 
 
4. Reciprocal Direct Investment: A Pareto Solution to IHT 
Numerous initiatives aimed at suppressing illicit migration activities have been 
suggested at international as well as national level. They include the enactment and 
amendment of legislation, the establishment of special units and training programs to counter 
human trafficking, the intensification of legal proceedings and sanctions, international 
co-operation among the related police units in the countries concerned etc.. Domestic and 
international resources are therefore channeled for blocking inflows, mandatory detention and 
sending illegal immigrants back to source countries. Prosecution of offenders, criminal law 
and legal enforcement can suppress and prevent illicit migrations.7 However, as long as the 
                                                 
7 The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in 2000. In 
particular, it regulates obligations of member states to achieve three objectives: preventing the crime of human 
trafficking, protecting victims and prosecuting traffickers. As suggested in Cho and Vadlamannati (2011), the 
Anti-trafficking Protocol reflects the interests of the major powers on IHT that threaten national security and 
damage the domestic human rights reputation of the destination countries. 
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root causes of illicit migrations, that is, the mass of people in poverty, severe environmental 
degradation, political stability and unemployment etc. persist in the source countries, 
repressive measures cannot stop persons to improve their wellbeing by capturing the potential 
gains from migration activities. The causes are in turn largely driven by the low stage of 
development and quality of public governance in the source countries. Other investigators 
suggest that the structural causes of illicit migrations need to be addressed by eliminating the 
debts of poor countries and a global redistribution of wealth to lagged economies. However, 
these initiatives do not generate direct and indirect benefits to leading economies and do not 
generate extra international wealth, which make them hardly sustainable. To the best of our 
knowledge, there are no initiatives to resolve the problem from the perspective of 
international division of labor, reciprocal investment and cooperation that can facilitate global 
development, convergence in living quality and an explosion of wealth increases to the 
countries involved. 
In this section, we device a sustainable scheme to harness the self-interest 
maximizing motives of related governments into productive activities that can alleviate the 
illicit migration activities in the short run and potentially eliminate them in the long run. The 
scheme offers a chance for all countries to enjoy a substantial increase in wealth while 
reducing illicit migration activities. It can address the humanitarian and global challenge of 
IHT by offering a solution to achieve a situation that all peoples in all countries to live 
peacefully and happily together. 
The scheme is devised based on the understanding that sustainable schemes, system 
and organizations must be built upon mutual benefits to all concerned parties under a specific 
environment or set of constraints. We call these schemes/systems/organizations Pareto 
schemes/systems/organizations. Our scheme sets up some organizations that embody a 
motivation structure. The structure motivates related agents′ behavior that generates economic 
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outcomes under a specific environment. The economic outcomes generated by the scheme 
result in the creation of new wealth and is Pareto improving to all the agents involved. 
Therefore it will have tendency to be sustained, duplicated and expanded in scale and 
influences over time that generate further Pareto developments. The outcomes will alleviate 
the demand for illicit migrations in the short run and potentially eliminate them in the long 
run. The scheme is called ‘reciprocal direct investment’ (RDI) that is detailed as follows:  
i. Agents:  
a.  Investment Company led or owned by the Government of Source/Lagged Country (GS);  
b.  Investment Company led or owned by the Government of Destination/Leading Country 
(GD) 
Governments manage coercive power and device motivation structure in a jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the quality of public governance is the ultimate determinant of economic growth 
rate and therefore the job opportunities, price of inputs, rate of wealth accumulation, poverty 
level and long-run living quality of a nation.8 When the governments lead or own the 
investment companies, the efficiency/profitability of the companies and the interests of the 
related governments and individuals who control the coercive power in the jurisdictions are 
connected. Moreover, the repeated interactions between the political and economic elites of 
the lagged and leading countries will facilitate their mutual trust and raise the quality of public 
governance of the lagged countries through learning by doing and imitations. Therefore the 
government-led cooperation can promote the long-run profitability of the companies and raise 
the dynamic gains of the countries involved. 
ii.  Organizations:  
a. SDIC: GS-GD Investment Company investing in the Source country. [shareholding: GS 
                                                 
8 For some related discussions, please refer to Mo (2007, 2010d). 
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(51%), GD (49%)]. 
b. DSIC: GD-GS Investment Company investing in the Destination country. [shareholding: 
GD (51%), GS (49%)].  
 
iii.  Activities: Reciprocal Direct Investment (RDI) 
a.  SDIC invests a seed project of $100 units of value in the source/lagged country, normally  
manufacturing units. 
b.  DSIC invests a seed project of $100 units of value in the destination/leading country, 
normally in trading and/or real estate projects. 
 
iv.  Outcomes:  
a. The profit-maximizing resource allocations are efficient: 
Under the RDI scheme, the total profit function of GS or GD equals: 
[0.51 Pi Qi ( Ki, Li) - 0.51( r Ki – wiLi )] + [0.49 Pj Qj( Kj, Lj) – 0.49 (r Kj – wjLj )],  
where [Pc Qc ( Kc, Lc)] and ( r Kc – wcLc ), c = i or j, equals to the revenue and cost functions 
of the SDIC and DSIC or vice versa. 
 
The MRPh of Kh and Lh equal to their respective opportunity costs when the agents 
maximize their profit. The productive efficiency condition is attained. The scheme is therefore 
‘efficiency compatible’. 
 
b.  Cooperative behavior is promoted among partner countries under the RDI scheme: 
A firm in the host economy requires various implicit firm-specific supports of the host 
authority which include basic infrastructures, free from illicit threats and corruption etc. for 
effective operation. Due to the problems caused by incomplete information and contract, 
agency problems may exist in the partnership relationships under the RDI scheme. Denoting 
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the implicit goods and services relating to the firm’s operation provided by the host partner be 
Hc, c = s, d, the profit function of SDIC is modified as follows: 
[0.51 P x Qs( Ks, Ls , Hs) - 0.51( r Ks + wsLs ) - Cs(Hs )] +  
[0.49 P x Qd( Kd, Ld, Hd) - 0.49 (r Kd + wdLd )] ,              (E5) 
 
where Hs is the implicit firm-specific supports of the host authority. Since the host only gets 
0.51 of the marginal benefit from providing Hs while bearing its full implicit marginal cost, 
the local authority of the host partner in the source country tend to under-provide the implicit 
supports to the SDIC. The same reasoning applies to Hd.9 
 
However, the reciprocal relationship can potentially eliminate this agency problem due 
to the exchange in direct investments between the partners. Assume we have a reaction 
function such that Hd = γ(Hs), the profit function of SDIC becomes: 
0.51 Qs( Ks, Ls , Hs) – 0.51( r Ks + wsLs ) – Cs(Hs )  
+ 0.49 Pd x Qd[ Kd, Ld, γ(Hs)] – 0.49 (r Kd + wdLd ).             (E6) 
 
Concerning the reaction of the partner, the profit maximizing Hs, Hs* is governed by the 
following first order equation: 
                     0.51 MRPHs + 0.49 MRPHd γ′ = Cs′ .                     (E7) 
 
(E7) implies that given the same Cs′, higher γ′ raises the marginal benefit of Hs to the GS and 
therefore induces higher Hs* provided by GS which is desirable to GD. This rational strategic 
tit for tat strategy (γ′ > 0) can potentially induce the partners to provide efficient level of the 
implicit supports. Similar reasoning applies to GS. Additionally, the closely repeated 
interactions and the patient government agents also minimize the agency problems associated 
                                                 
9 Normally, the DSIC suffers less from the agency problems due to better corporate and public governance in the 
destination/leading economies. 
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with incomplete contract and positive monitoring costs. The partners will tend to adopt 
cooperative strategies to each other for capturing the potential long-term gains generated by 
the scheme.10   
4.1  Sibling Projects to Accelerate Global Development 
In order to speed up the convergence in the global economies and enlarge the mutual gains 
from the RDI scheme, it will be useful if part of the profits in the RDI scheme can be 
ploughed back for additional ‘sibling projects’. The idea is illustrated by the following 
example: 
Suppose the investment amount of each RDI project is $100 units. The overall rate of return 
in SDIC and DSIC are 40% and 10% respectively.11 
The ‘Sibling Project scheme’: 
a. Each investment company contributes $10M (the amount equals to the total profit of the 
company with the lower rate of return, that is, the DSIC in this case). A total of 20M will 
be used for setting up new Sibling companies. 
b. The money in the Sibling companies can be used for another RDI project. If trust and 
cooperative tradition between the partners have been established, the money can also be 
solely invested in the source countries that normally generate a higher rate of return in the 
long run. 
c. This scheme can generate sustaining expansion of good governance, tools variety, 
management skill and knowledge when the political and economic elites in the lagged 
economy modernize while at the same time, generate expansion of wealth, influences, 
                                                 
10 The efficient level of Hs is determined by the equation: MRPHs - 1 = 0. For more detail analyses, please refer 
to Appendix A. 
11 The returns of the RDI are hypothetical. However, in longer-term, the rate of return in the source countries 
tends to be higher but less stable while that in the destination countries tend to be stable but relatively low. 
Related simple models to illustrate the determinants of the rate of returns are sketched in the appendix B. Under 
ideal situation, the gains of the firms operating in the lagged economies include capital appreciation of the 
production unit caused by the rapid technology and management improvements in the catching-up process plus 
the gains from lower resources price. 
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investment and trade opportunities to the leading economy. 
 
4.2  The Immediate and Dynamic Gains of the Scheme 
a. The GS and GD will share the return of 30x0.51=15.3 and 30x0.49=14.7 respectively that 
generate additional fiscal revenue. The revenue can reduce the tax burden and/or raise 
public expenditures of the related countries. They can strengthen the political supports for 
the RDI scheme. The sibling projects set up by the profit of $20 units will generate future 
profits and related dynamic gains. 
b. In the longer run, the dynamic gains from the higher growth rate of tools variety, trade 
volume, and rapid improvements in living quality and purchasing power generate 
substantial direct and indirect benefits to both leading and lagged economies.12 This 
exchange in FDI will result in the convergences in technology and living quality between 
the leading and lagged economies at a higher level.  
c. The projects generate rapid development in the source country that provides quality job 
opportunities to the people. They therefore reduce the demand for illicit migrations and 
the attractiveness of trafficking business. 
d. The convergence in the standard of living in the long run eliminates the demand for IHT 
caused by economic reasons. 
                                                 
12 A more elaborate treatment is attached in the Appendix B. One may query that market agents will be 
automatic and are most effective to capture the potential gains from the investments. There are several reasons 
why government involvements are more effective in this case. First, top government agents control coercive 
force directly. They can avoid the inefficiencies and corruptions caused by widespread government failures in 
most lagged countries. Second, it is increasingly recognized that the quality of public governance is the ultimate 
determinant of economic development through its effect on the motivation structure or equivalently, the rules of 
the game. (for related discussions, please refer to Mo, 2007, 2010d). The direct involvements of the political and 
economic elites of the lagged countries will rapidly raise the quality of public governance when are exposed to 
the international standard and rules of corporate and public governance during the frequent interactions with 
those partners from the leading countries. Third, the trust between governments building up during the RDI 
schemes will open up opportunities for other forms of cooperation. For instance, the spirits of RDI can be 
expanded in scale to ‘reciprocal chartered cities’ or ‘reciprocal special economic zones’ that further release 
economic activities from political and other institutional constraints in the partner countries. (Romer, 2010) The 
above benefits cannot be generated through the private direct investment activities. Moreover, although the 
spillover benefits of the scheme are encompassing to all levels of a society, it generates direct benefits to political 
and economic elites in both countries. This can make the firms operating under the scheme much more effective, 
successful and sustainable politically. 
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In general, the direct gains of the leading economy include the higher rate of return received 
and assets appreciation of the investments in lagged economies. The lagged economy gains 
from the extended networks, learning opportunities, more quantity of tools and its variety 
generated from the direct investments by leading economies. Both economies are benefited 
from the dynamic gains generated by economic integration, division of labor and interactions. 
(Mo, 2010a) The standard of living and the wage rate of both countries will converge over 
time at a much higher level. 
Through the RDI scheme, the illicit migration needs caused by border controls are 
replaced by exchanges in land, capital, technology and profitable opportunities across 
countries. Similar to the successful experiences of the incremental reforms in China that retain 
the benefits of vested interest groups in the country while expand new opportunities for future 
gains, the RDI scheme does not infringe the vested interests of the existing interest groups in 
the destination and source economies while opens up a new frontier to capture the benefits 
from international direct investments, division of labor, interactions and trade which is Pareto 
improving to all parties. The RDI and sibling projects provide more choices to all potential 
migrants, including poor people, female and children for improving their fortune by staying in 
the source countries. International instability caused poverty, international crime and illicit 
migrations will be alleviated when the scheme raises the relative price of productive and 
entrepreneurial activities relative to commercial sex and related criminal activities. The 
human rights hazard caused by IHT will be eliminated in the dynamic advancements. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provide a market solution that is self-enforcing, self-perpetuating and 
Pareto improving to all related parties for reducing IHT and improving international human 
rights. Illicit migrations and in particular IHT is one of the least studied forms of international 
                                                                                        18 
movement in persons in the mainstream economics although it generates widespread 
international security problems and humanitarian hazards. Given the persistence of huge 
disparities of living conditions between countries and strict border controls, the pool of 
potential illicit migrants will continue to grow. It will lead to increasing international tensions 
and humanitarian disasters over time.  
We know that the ideal of free human beings who are able to enjoy civil and political 
rights and freedom from fear and poverty can only be achieved if conditions for survival are 
established in a nation. It is the strong economic fundamentals that provide foundations for 
promoting human rights and freedom, justice and peace in the world. Only when the 
economic fundamentals are in place, the lower order and higher order human rights can be 
satisfied. The RDI scheme sets up organizations under the lead or ownership of related 
governments that are most likely to work for the long-run profits of related projects. The 
scheme provides additional economic instrument for global development that is 
wealth-creating and Pareto improving to all parties involved. With the virtuous cycles 
generated by the scheme, it will be able to eliminate poverty, improve public governance, 
raise employment opportunities and generate sustaining economic developments in the source 
countries. To conclude, the short-run and long-run effects of the RDI scheme on global 
development include: 
i. Speed up trading in goods and services between leading and lagged economies. 
ii. Facilitate the exchange of labors legally between leading and lagged economies. 
iii. Speed up technical convergence between leading and lagged economies at a higher level. 
iv. Speed up the advancement in the quality of corporate and public governance of the 
lagged economies through frequent interactions with the leading economies. 
v. Expand international interactions, scale and scope of global economies that generate the 
benefits of scale economies, division of labor, and technical improvements to all parties 
involved. The trust building up in the RDI process generates further cooperation 
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opportunities and integration to the partner countries. 
IHT is usually thought of in terms of criminal or human rights violations, rather than from the 
perspective of international division of labor and trade. By treating IHT as an economic 
problem caused by income disparities and poverty, we contribute to enhance the 
understanding on the nature of IHT activities and to propose a novel way of international 
cooperation and mechanism to eliminate the root causes of IHT. Instead of relying on 
common humanitarian and/or suppressive measures, we propose the RDI scheme and 
investigate the related mechanism that generates a sustaining dynamism for closing the 
international disparities in living quality across countries which is beneficial to all related 
parties. We conclude that, through the scheme of RDI, we can harness the self-interest of the 
governments and related political and economic elites to promote the level of human rights, 
peace and living quality to a much higher level globally. The scheme can alleviate IHT in the 
short run and potentially be able to put an end to illicit migrations in the world by eliminating 
the fundamental causes of the activities. 
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Appendix A:  
Agency Problems, Implicit Government Supports and Credibility 
With the reaction function in (E6), the profit maximizing Hs, Hs* is governed by the following 
first order equation: 
  
0.51 MRPHs + 0.49 MRPHd γ′ = Cs′                  (A1)   
 
The efficient level of Hs is determined by: MRPHs = Cs′ . 
The γ′ that will induce efficient level of Hs can be found by setting MRPHs = Cs′ in (A1), such 
that: 
0.51 MRPHs + 0.49 MRPHd γ′ = MRPHs ; 
Solving for γ′ , the ‘efficient response’ of GD (γ′*) equals to: MRPHs / MRPHd > 0.    
 
In symmetry, the efficient response of GD, let it be β′*, equals to: MRPHd / MRPHs . 
When MRPHs = MRPHd , α′* = β′* = 1, that will result in the efficient levels of Hs and Hd 
respectively. 
According to the analyses, besides the patient government agents and repeated 
interaction with close monitoring, the optimal response of tit for tat strategy of the partners 
under the RDI scheme can potentially resolve the agency problems and result in efficient 
outcomes among the partners. 
 
 
Appendix B:  
The gains from the RDI Scheme of the lagged and leading economies 
 
a. The gains generated by the RDI scheme to the lagged economy 
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In the cooperation process, the GS of the lagged economy can have immediate gains from: 
1. the trading and investment networks built up in the destination/leading economy.  
2. a stable rate of investment return generated from the investments in the leading and 
domestic economies which strengthen the source of fiscal revenue and foreign exchanges 
3. more legal migration opportunities to the destination country and more quality 
employment opportunities provided by the projects under the scheme, particularly to the 
political and economic elites. The interaction and learning opportunities open to them 
facilitate the improvements in the quality of public governance in the lagged economy. The 
benefits of better governance spread rapidly to the whole economy. 
 
Moreover, the domestic firms in the lagged economy can gain substantially from the 
interaction opportunities with the leading economy as elaborated in Mo (2010b, 2010c). The 
GDP of an economy (Y) depends on the amount of capital/tools (X), labor (L) and the level of 
tools variety (V), such that: 
βαθ
α
LXVY = = βα LXA ; with A equals θαV  ,              
where V is the number of tools variety and 0<θ <1 is the level of differential among the tools 
exogenously given to the firm in a country. 
 
The growth rate of the economy therefore equals to: 
L
dL
X
dXd
Y
dY βαγθ
α ++= = 
L
dL
X
dX
V
dV βαθ
α ++ ,             
with (α/θ) ≥ 1. 
 
Since direct investments from leading economy brings additional capital (X) as well as new 
tools varieties (V), the local firms in the lagged economy is provided with the opportunity to 
imitate and learn from the advance production method. Motivated to capture the innovative 
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quasi-rent, the advanced production method will be imitated by all other production units in 
the source economy. The lagged economy can therefore enjoy higher growth rate and gain 
substantially in this dynamic process as suggested in Mo (2010a, b). This results in the capital 
appreciation of the production units under the RDI scheme which become part of the 
investment gains to the GD. 
 
a. The gains to the firms operating in the lagged economy13 
 
In leading/matured economies, investment opportunities normally shrink over time due to the 
diminishing marginal products and higher input prices. The RDI scheme generates additional 
and safe investment opportunities to the investors in the leading economies. This provides 
additional profitable opportunities to the firms in the leading economies directly when they 
invest in low costs lagged economies.  
Suppose that without the RDI scheme, the profit of a firm invested in 
destination/leading economy (LP) equals to the total revenue minus the total cost of 
production. The firm faces higher labor price ( w ) in the leading economies, such that: 
DP  = )()],(),,([
****
XrLwrwXrwLQP +− . 
The RDI scheme generates the opportunity to invest in lagged economies with lower labor 
cost ( w ), such that the profit of the firm invested in source/lagged economy (SP) equals to: 
SP = )()],(),,([ **** XrLwrwXrwLQP +− . 
                                                 
13 The following calculation is for illustration purpose only. The scheme is an ‘incremental innovation’ in the 
sense that, without the scheme, the RDI opportunity does not exist. The total profit generated under the scheme 
is the direct total benefit to the agents involved if the related economies have excess capacity. In this example, 
our calculation is based on the assumption that the new investment opportunity in the lagged economy crowds 
out the investment in the leading economy. In many cases, there are substantial redundant resources in an 
economy, particularly in those lagged economies which make the new investment opportunities have minimal 
opportunity cost. If there is a lack of profitable investment opportunities in the leading economy also, our 
calculation substantially underestimates the social gains of the related projects. In general, the dynamic gains and 
the spillover benefits generated from the scheme are much larger and important than the static gains in the firm 
level as illustrated in this case. Mo (2010a) shows that leading economies also enjoy dynamic gains of 
productivity improvement during their interactions with other economies. 
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Under the assumptions of same output level (Q), rental price of capital (r) and output price (P), 
the gain from the firm to operate in the lagged economy relative to operating in the leading 
economy equals:  
SP - DP = - ( ** XrLw + ) + ** XrLw +   = 
-
****** )(])()([ XrLwwXXrLLw
aaa +++−++ , where 
;;;
****** aaa wwwXXXLLL +=−=+=
 
and, 
*aL , 
*aX , 
a
w > 0.  
 = 
a *a a**( w L rX ) w L− + + .  
The firm can gain from substituting cheaper labor in the lagged economy for capital that 
equals to a a**( w L r X )− + . When the firm uses identical inputs as that operated in the 
leading economy, such that *aL and 
*aX equal to zero, it still enjoys the lower wage rate in 
the lagged economy and gains additional profit of 
*a
Lw . The other static gain of the firm 
includes the lower land-rent. The dynamic gain to the firm may include the appreciation of the 
production unit when the investment environment improves in the lagged economy over time. 
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